FONDEMENTS THÉORIQUES DU DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE: LA RÉGULATION DES POUVOIRS ECONOMIQUES

Abstract

This article proposes a theoretical reconstruction of Economic Law based on the concept of the regulation of economic powers. It argues that the classical approaches to Economic Law- namely the instrumental and autonomist perspectives - are no longer sufficient to capture the complexity of contemporary economies characterized by globalization, the plurality of normative centers, and the emergence of hybrid economic powers. Drawing on an institutionalist approach, the analysis demonstrates that Economic Law should primarily be understood as a legal framework for structuring, limiting, and legitimizing power relations within the economy. The study mobilizes major European and African doctrinal contributions, particularly those of Gérard Farjat, Claude Champaud, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Alain Supiot, Gunther Teubner, and Roger Masamba Makela. The article further demonstrates that the contemporary foundations of regulation lie not only in market failures but also in government failures and in the necessity of maintaining an institutional balance among public, private, and hybrid powers. It therefore contends that contemporary Economic Law should be conceived as a law governing the regulation of economic powers, especially within African economies and the OHADA legal area.