Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Strategies: Balancing Security and Stability in a Changing World Order.

Authors

  • Chick Edmond Old Dominion University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61841/ygzbet12

Keywords:

Nuclear Deterrence, Stability, Multipolarity, Balance of Power and Security

Abstract

In an increasing evolving global landscape, nuclear deterrence strategies face an unprecedented challenge as the global order transcends from bipolar to a multipolar dimension. This paper analyses the ramifications of preserving stability  and  security  in  a  world  dominated  by  diverse  power  centers,  technological  innovations  and  emerging global threats. It examines the practical and theoretical implications of nuclear deterrence in a polycentric context including  the  risk  of  escalation,  miscalculation  and  proliferation.  By  examining  the  historical  trends,  current mechanisms  and  potential  future  events  which  increases  the  likelihood  of  a nuclear disaster.  This  research paper provides a critical perspective on how states can adapt deterrence strategies to their national needs by enhancing global stability. It adopts theoretical framework such as balance of power, power transition and threat theories to demonstrate  how  deterrence  strategies  can  be  optimized.  This  paper  highlights  the  importance  of  robust communication  channels,  reinforcing  nuclear  control  agreements,  collaborative  security  policies  to  mitigate  risks and fostering a sustainable equilibrium in the realm of nuclear affairs.

References

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Published

2025-06-09

How to Cite

Edmond, C. (2025). Evolving Nuclear Deterrence Strategies: Balancing Security and Stability in a Changing World Order. Journal of Advance Research in Social Science and Humanities (ISSN 2208-2387), 11(2), 13-18. https://doi.org/10.61841/ygzbet12